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SUMMARY
A Six-Man, Self-Contained, Electrochemical Carbon Dioxide Concentrating Subsystem
(CS-6) for Space Station Prototype (SSP) use was successfully designed, fabri-
cated, and tested. The design of the unit was based on the specifications and
requirements for the Environmental Control and Life Support System (EC/LSS) of
the SSP.
Two full-size mockups of the CS-6 were constructed to aid in subsystem design
and packaging, with special emphasis placed on subsystem maintenance. All
subsystem interfaces, whether electrical or mechanical, were designed for compat-
ibility with SSP requirements and operation. Nine different types of SSP common-
ality components were used in the design of the subsystem.
A Product Assurance Program incorporated quality assurance, reliability, maintain-
ability, safety, and material conformance. Activities included preparation of a
Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA), a Fault Detection and
Isolation Analysis (FDIA), a Single Point Failure Analysis (SPFA), a Safety
Hazard Analysis, and Nonmetallic and Metallic Materials Lists.
Ground Support Accessories (GSA) were designed to simulate interfaces for sub-
system checkout and testing. Specifically, the GSA provided electrical power,
process gases, and parametric data display allowing real time indication of
operating status in engineering units. A Ground Support Panel was designed and
fabricated to allow for CS-6 operation without a Data Acquisition Unit (DAU) and
without the computerized subsystem control provided within the SSP by the
Acceptance Checkout Equipment (ACE) or Information Management System (IMS).
A test program was successfully completed which covered Shakedown Testing,
Design Verification Testing (DVT), and Acceptance Testing. All phases of
system testing were done at SSP operating conditions with the CS-6 exceeding its
design point performance prediction.
Complete subsystem documentation was prepared. It consisted of design documents
(e.g., drawings, design specifications) interface documents (e.g., interface
specifications), and product assurance documents (e.g., materials lists).
INTRODUCTION
Under NASA Contract NAS2-6478, Life Systems, Inc. developed a Six-Man, Self-
Contained, Electrochemical Carbon Dioxide Concentrating Subsystem (CS-6). This
subsystem was designed as the Carbon Dioxide Collection Subsystem (CCS) of the
Air Revitalization Group (ARG) of the Space Station Prototype (SSP). The
development of this system was divided into three phases: (1) design of the CS-6
per requirements and specifications of the SSP program, (2) fabrication of the
CS-6 per SSP specifications and requirements, and (3) Shakedown Testing, Design
Verification Testing (DVT), and Acceptance Testing of the CS-6.
To accomplish the above, the program was divided into five tasks and program
management functions. The specific objectives of the five tasks were to:
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1. Design and develop the CS-6 according to SSP specifications, require-
ments, and philosophies for incorporation into the NASA SSP life
support system.
2. Design, fabricate and modify Ground Support Accessories (GSA) for
Shakedown, Design Verification, and Acceptance Testing of the subsystem.
3. Implement a Product Assurance Program to integrate reliability,
maintainability, safety, quality assurance and material control concepts
into the subsystem during the design and test phases.
4. Test components to design and performance criteria prior to subsystem
assembly and conduct subsystem Shakedown, Design Verification, and
Acceptance Tests at SSP operating conditions.
5. Completely prepare all subsystem documentation (drawings, specifica-
tions, test plans, Product Assurance documentation, etc.).
This report covers the phase of work performed by Life Systems, Inc. under NASA
Contract NAS2-6478 to design, fabricate and test the CS-6 for SSP application.
CS-6/SSP DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
The design, performance and interface requirements for the Carbon Dioxide
Collection Subsystem (CCS) for the SSP program evolved from the SSP General
Specification SVHS-4655, Revision G, "General Design and Performance Requirements
for a Space Station Prototype," written by the SSP Prime Contractor. This speci-
fication, in addition to the "Design Criteria Handbook," SSP Document No. 9,
Paragraph 11.0, revised August 28, 1972, were the main documents specifying the
system interface requirements in the CS-6 design. In addition to these two
documents, other information assimilated through design review meetings and
telephone conversations with NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) and SSP Prime
Contractor personnel was used in the CS-6 design.
SSP Background
The SSP program and its two main phases: ( ) Preliminary Design, and Detailed
Design, Procurement/Fabrication and Checkout, covered a period of four years.
During Phase 2-A of the program, two major decisions were made: the maximum2
allowable partial pressure of CO2 (pCO ) was decreased from 1013 to 400 N/m
(7.6 to 3.0 mm Hg), and the Molecular Sieve Carbon Dioxide Removal Subsystem,
with associated solar heat collection equipment, was replaced by an electrochem-
ical CCS. Life Systems, Inc. became involved in supplying the CCS for the SSP
in October, 1972 with the task of supplying a backup system for SSP application.
Previous electrochemical carbon dioxide (CO2) collection work done by Life
Systems' personnel spanned a nine-year period with over 400,000 electrochemical
cell-hours of operating time accumulated. A second phase of Life Systems'
involvement began in December, 1972 when it was chosen to supply the CCS for the
SSP program.
(1) References cited are on page 65.
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CS-6/SSP Design Reviews
A series of design reviews were held to establish and evaluate SSP design philos-
ophies and to insure compatibility of the CS-6 with SSP design requirements.
These design reviews involved representatives of NASA Ames Research Center
(ARC), AA JSC, the SSP Prime Contractor, NASA Marshall Space Flight Center
(MSFC), and Life Systems, Inc. The various design review meetings held,
agencies represented, and meeting dates are shown in Table 1.
CS-6 SUBSYSTEM
The function of the CS-6 CCS for the SSP program is to remove 6.0 kg (13.2 lb)
per day of CO2 from the cabin atmosphere and deliver the CO premixed with
hydrogen (H ) to the Carbon Dioxide Reduction Subsystem (CR ). The CO2 removed
will be subiequently processed by the CRS for eventual recovery of oxygen (02).
The CS-6 consists of electrochemical modules, whose function is to remove CO2
from the process air stream, and mechanical and electrical components which
enable automatic operation and provide for internal as well as remote monitoring
of the subsystem. Monitoring will shut the subsystem down following the failure
of any key component within the subsystem or interruption of the necessary
service from a supporting subsystem.
Subsystem Design and Mockups
Table 2 shows the design specifications for the CS-6. Three major specification
modifications affecting the CS-6 were made during the course of SSP development:
(1) allowable downtime of the subsystem was increased from less 2than 10 minutes
to 8-12 hours, (2) inlet pCO 2 was decreased from 400 to 381 N/m (3 to 2.86 mm
Hg), and (3) the availability of 28 VDC and 115 VAC, 60 Hz power was eliminated.
Subsystem Mockups
Two full-scale mockups were built during the course of the design and development
of the CS-6. These mockups were used at formal design reviews as well as in-
house design discussions on meeting all SSP design, packaging and maintainability
specifications.
Figure 1 shows the CS-6 mockup prior to the Approval Design Review (ADR) held at
Life Systems. Figure 2 shows the mockup of the final CS-6 design, revised to
incorporate the maximum number of SSP commonality components.
Subsystem Features
The following is a summary of features incorporated into the CS-6 design:
1. Insitu maintenance at the individual cell level for increased subsystem
reliability and longer module operating life without replacement.
2. Automatic subsystem nitrogen (N ) purge during appropriate mode transi-
tions (e.g., upon startup, shutdown, etc.).
(a) Represented at software meetings only.
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TABLE 1 CS-6/SSP DESIGN REVIEW MEETINGS
Meeting Agencies Represented Date
SSP Air Revitalization Group (ARG) NASA ARC, NASA MSFC, NASA JSC, SSP May 1-5, 1972
Approval Design Review (ADR) Prime Contractor, Life Systems, Inc.
CS-6/SSP Electrical Interface Meeting NASA JSC, Life Systems, Inc. June 19, 1972
CS-6 Interim Design Review (IDR) NASA ARC, NASA JSC, SSP Prime July 6-7, 1972
Contractor, Life Systems, Inc.
CS-6 AIDR NASA ARC, NASA JSC, SSP Prime August 3-4, 1972
Contractor, Life Systems, Inc.
CS-6 ADR NASA ARC, NASA JSC, SSP Prime October 2-3, 1972
Contractor, Life Systems, Inc.
SSP Software Meeting NASA JSC, NASA MSFC, SSP Prime October 4-5, 1972
Contractor, SSP Data Management
Subcontractors, Life Systems, Inc.
SSP Software Meeting NASA JSC, NASA MSFC, SSP Prime November 16-17, 1972
Contractor, SSP Data Management
Subcontractors, Life Systems, Inc.
CS-6 AADR NASA ARC, NASA JSC, SSP Prime January 16-18, 1973
Contractor, Life Systems, Inc.
CS-6/SSP Electrical Interface NASA JSC, SSP Prime Contractor, February 1-2, 1973
Meeting Life Systems, Inc.
CS-6 Fabrication Review Meeting NASA JSC, Life Systems, Inc. May 2, 1973
Zi/ Sscms.I, INC.
TABLE 2 CS-6 DESIGN SPECIFICATIONS
Number of Crew (Continuous) 6
CO2 Removal Requirements
Nominal (48-Hr Average), kg/d (Lb/Day) 6.0 (13.2)
Maximum (4-Hr Duration), kg/d (Lb/Day) 9.3 (20.4)
Cabin Atmosphere
Total Pressure, kN/m2 (Psia) 101-105 (14.7-15.2)
Temperature, K (F) 291-297 (65-75)
Dew Point Temperature, K (F) 281-287 (46-57)
0 Partial Pressure, kN/m 2 (Psia) 21.0-22.6 (3.04-3.28)
CO2 Partial Pressure
Nominal, N/m (mm Hg) <400 (<3)
Operating Range, N/m2 (mm Hg) 200-400 (1.5-3)
Diluent Air Constituents
Process Air
Total Pressure, N/m2 (Inch Water) Ambient + 1495 (+ 6)
Temperature, K (F) Dew Point + 3.34 (+ 6)
Dew Point Temperature, K (F) 281-283 (46-50)
O Partial Pressure, kN/m2 (Psia) 21.0-22.6 (3.04-3.28)
Nominal, N/m (mm Hg 381 (2.86)
Operating Range, N/m (mm Hg) 200-385 (1.5-2.89)
Diluent Air Constituents
Cooling Air 2
Total Pressure, N/m (Inch Water) Ambient + 1495 (+ 6)
Temperature, K (F) Process Air Dew Point
+ 3.34 (+ 6)
H2 Supply 2
Total Pressure, kN/m (Psia) <138 (<20)
Temperature, K (F) 291-297 (65-75)
Dew Point Temperature, K (F) 283-289 (50-60)
H2 + CO Exhaust
Toial Pressure Ambient
Electrical Power 106-122 VRMS, 400 ±40 Hz,
30, 5 Wire
Purge Supply
Type Gas 2 N
Pressure, kN/m (Psia) 310 (45)
Packaging Self-Contained
Gravity 0-1 g
Allowable Downtime 8-12 Hr
Duty Cycle Variable(a)
(a) The SSP Specification cites potential orbital On/Off cyclic operation.
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FIGURE 2 CS-6 MOCKUP (FINAL VERSION)
3. Ninety-six cells combined into six, 16-cell modules to reduce auxiliary
hardware requirements and to enhance subsystem maintainability.
4. Captive fasteners and easily maintainable fluid connections for all
Line Replaceable Units (LRUs) and interface connections.
5. Subsystem controls which (a) maintain a constant CO2 removal rate or
regulate this rate to match requirements reflected in the observed
cabin pCO level, (b) maintain a constant process air flow rate or
regulate This rate to match requirements reflected in the observed
cabin pCO2 level, and (c) maintain a constant process-air-inlet-dew-
point-to-module temperature differential.
6. Automatic sequencing of the subsystem controlled variables when going
from one steady-state mode of operation to another.
7. Optical isolation of all subsystem input commands (eliminates ground
loops and prevents the transmission of spurious false signals).
8. "Black Box" component level maintainability (LRU).
9. Electronic circuitry compatible with the SSP Item 970 Data Acquisition
Unit (DAU), the Acceptance Checkout Equipment (ACE) computer at JSC,
and the Information Management System (IMS) computer at MSFC.
10. Overrides on all valves and blower speeds.
11. Rack and panel mounted electronic circuitry.
12. Compatibility wj NASA flammability, outgassing, odor, and materials
specifications.
13. Air cooling of the electronics.
14. Extensive use of SSP commonality components.
15. Single power source (115 VAC, 400 Hz, 30).
16. Self-contained protection for safety critical parameters (emergency
controller).
17. Fault Detection and Isolation Analysis (FDIA) sensors and circuits to
isolate any failed LRU.
Subsystem Operation
Figure 3 is a schematic of the CS-6. It shows the functional location of all
subsystem components and all gas and electric interconnections.
Operating Modes
The CS-6 has five modes of operation: Normal, Dump, Standby, Shutdown, and
8
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Purge. The first mode of operation, Normal Mode, is one in which the subsystem
is operating in a normal fashion with the H2 and CO2 exhaust from the CS-6
vented to the CRS. In the Dump Mode the CS-6 is operating with the H2 and CO2exhaust vented to vacuum. In the Standby Mode the CS-6 is standing by for a
command to go back into operation. This mode is used in cyclic (dark side of
earth orbit) operation. In the Purge Mode the CS-6 is continually being purged
to vaccum with N2 . The final mode of operation is the Shutdown Mode which
places the CS-6 into a shutdown condition. While the subsystem is in a shutdown
condition, subsystem parameters are continually being monitored and data is
being sent to the data management system. Figure 4 illustrates the permissible
transitions between the five operating modes. The detailed and individual steps
required for the various mode transitions are shown in Figure 5. Table 3 sum-
marizes the steady-state valve positions and other controlled variables for each
of the five operating modes.
Fluid Streams
Three major fluid streams flow through the CS-6: the process air stream, the H2and CO stream (with possible N2 purging) and the cooling air stream. Process
air ang cooling air are drawn from a 0.236 m /s (500 scfm) air stream exhausting
from the Cabin Temperature and Humidity Control Subsystem (CTHCS) of the ARG.
This air stream enters the CS-6 through the inlet chamber of the air plenum (see
Figure 3) and is returned to the main air distribution system from the exit
chamber of the air plenum. The two plenum chambers2are connected with a straight
rectangular flow section sized to producS a 374 N/m (1.5 inch water) pressure
drop at the maximum flow rate of 0.236 m /s (500 scfm) of air.
Process Air Stream. Air is drawn by two process air blowers (543-31, -32)(a)
from the inlet chamber of the air plenum through the cathode compartments of the
electrochemical cells and returned to the air plenum exhaust chamber. Each of
the two blowers draws air through three modules (890-31, -32, -33 and 890-34,
-35, -36) of 16 cells each (48 cells total). The process air leaves the inlet
chamber of the air plenum in a common line and passes through a decompression2
isolation valve (305-33) before separating into two equal flows of 1.27 x 10-
m /s (27 scfm) (at nominal conditions) each, one to each of the two groups of
three modules. In each of the two individual paths the air flows through a
process air inlet sensor (875-31 or 875-32), through the 48 cells in parallel,
combines to flow through the process air exhaust sensor (875-33 or 875-34),
passes through a decompression isolation valve (305-34 or 305-35) and is forced
by a process air blower (543-31 or 543-32) into a common return duct before
returning to the air plenum exhaust chamber. The three decompression isolation
valves isolate the cathode compartments of all six modules during cabin decompres-
sion to prevent escape of water vapor from the cell electrolyte. The process
air sensors at the inlet to the modules measure air flow rate using a two-
thermistor type flow sensing device and also measure process air inlet temperature
which is only used as a test point. The process air sensors at the exhaust of
the modules use three redundant thermistors to measure process air exhaust
temperature (equivalent, by definition, to module temperature) and also use a
fourth thermistor to detect any liquid entrained in the exhaust air stream of
(a) Numbers in parenthesis refer to SSP Component Item Numbers as indicated in
Figure 3.
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TABLE 3 CS-6 CONTROLLED VARIABLES, STEADY-STATE CONDITIONS
Control Variables
Blowers
Valve Valve Valve Valve Valve Valve Valve Valve Valve Module 543-31
Mode 305-33 306-07 306-08 306-30 305-34 305-35 306-38 306-39 306-37 Current 543-32
Shutdown (5)(a) Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Open Off Off
Standby (3) Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Open Closed Off Off
Normal Operation (1) Open Closed Closed Open Open Open Open Closed Closed On On
Dump Operation (2) Open Closed Closed Open Open Open Closed Open Closed On On
Purge (4) Closed Open Open Closed Closed Closed Closed Open Closed Off Off
(a) Mode Number, as defined in Figure 4.
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the modules. The process air blowers are located downstream of the modules to
eliminate adverse effects on module moisture balance due to the air temperature
rise caused by blower heat generation.
Hydrogen, Carbon Dioxide and Nitrogen (Purge) Stream. Hydrogen gas is supplied
at a nominal flow rate of 1.77 x 10-4 ±1% m3 /s (10.6 ±1% slpm) from the Oxygen
Generation Subsystem (OGS) of the ARG. The H2 enters the CS-6 through a shutoff
valve (306-30) after which it is divided into six equal flows by two H flow and
distribution mountings (882-31, -32). Each item 882 provides two functions: it
divides the flow into three equal portions through the use of fixed orifices and
it senses the H flow rate in each of the three paths using a two-thermistor
flow sensing arrangement. The outputs of the flow sensors provide information
to the FDIA circuits.
Each of the three flow paths from the two H flow and distribution mountings is
connected to one electrochemical module. Tie H flows in series through each of
the 16 cells of a module. As H2 flows through ihe module, a portion of it is
consumed while CO , transferred from the cathode side, is continuously added to
the H stream. Tie mixed H2 and CO exhausts from the six modules are combined
to eiiher flow through a shutoff valve (306-38) to the CRS (Normal Mode) or
through a backpressure regulator (310-32), a shutoff valve (306-39) and a hand
valve (507-32) to vacuum (Dump Mode).
At a nominal flow rate of 1.77 x 10-4 m 3/s (10.6 slpm) the pressure drop across
the H2 flow and distribution mounting is 21 kN m2 (3.0 psid) while the pressure
drop across a module is approximately 1034 N/mZ (0.15 psid). By flowing the H2
in series through the 16 cells of each module, each cell is supplied a minimum
of 16 times the excess (above stoichiometric requirements) H2 it would receive
in a parallel arrangement. The series flow pattern eliminates the complication
of subdividing the total H2 stream into 96 parallel flow paths with a potential
H2 starvation problem.
The pressure 1lvel within the anode compartments of the modules is maintained at
34.5 ±6.9 kN/m (5 ±1 psig) by regulator (310-32) during the Dump Mode or, when
supplying H2 and CO2 to the CRS, by a similar backpressure regulator located in
the 5RS. Both pressure regulators are adjustable over a range of 6.9 to 69.0
kN/m (1 to 10 psig) but will be set at a nominal value of 34.5 kN/m2 (5 psig).
Three pressure transducers (877-31, -32, -33) are located in the H2 , and H2 and
CO2 passages of the CS-6. One pressure transducer (877-32) (not included in
present design configuration due to overall curtailment of SSP activities) is
located upstream of the H flow and distribution mountings while the other two
pressure transducers are Iocated downstream of the modules in the combined anode
gas exhaust line. High and low pressure shutdown levels are provided to both
the primary (871-31) and the emergency (872-31) controllers. High H2 and CO2
backpressure could lead to eventual matrix breakthrough while low backpressure
indicates lack of H2 which may result from a cell matrix failure or interruption
of the supply stream from the OGS.
The H2 passageways of the CS-6 interface with the 207 kN/m
2 (30 psig) N2 supply
of the ARG of the SSP through two service lines (one redundant) which permit
purging the passageways of H during a subsystem shutdown, during subsystem
startup or as commanded by tie Purge Mode. The primary and redundant service
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lines interface through two shutoff valves (306-07, -08). Nitrogen flow, when
required, is equally divided between the six modules through the two H2 flow and
distribution mountings. The5sa e orifices that divided the H2 flow provide an
equal flow rate of 3.0 x 10 m /s (1.8 slpm) of N2 to each module at a supply
pressure of 207 kN/m2 (30 psig). A two minute N2 purge is supplied both during
subsystem startup and shutdown. The resulting N volume flowing during this
time is approximately five times the volume of te H2 passageways, sufficient to
lower the H2 level to safe values.
An exhaust valve (306-37) permits venting of the H2 passageways to ambient
following the N2 purge prior to entering the Shutdown Mode. This purge is
automatically accomplished and the pressure normally retained in the H passage-
ways by the pressure regulator or by the regulator located within the CRS is
released. The exhaust of valve (306-37) is directed against the sensing element
of a combustible gas sensor (178-02) to verify that complete purging of the H2
passageways has been accomplished. This same sensor, in conjunction with a
similar sensor (178-01) and an additional pair of sensors (178-03, -37), also
performs a leak detection function by being mounted above H -carrying components
and connections. Signals from these sensors are sent to FDIA and shutdown
circuits. Automatic shutdowns for combustible gas are included in both primary
and emergency controllers. As an added safety feature, the hand valve (507-32)
provides for manually isolating the CS-6 from vacuum.
Cooling Air Stream. Cooling air is drawn from the inlet chamber of the air
plenum by two independent vane axial cooling air blowers (345-31, -32) across
the external fins of the cells. Two parallel and independent cooling air
streams exist with each of the blowers serving one group of three modules. The
amount of cooling required is determined by a signal based on a temperature
differential between the dew point temperature of the incoming process air and
the dry bulb temperature of the exiting process air from the modules. The two
cooling air streams return simultaneously to the exit chamber of the air plenum.
To maintain moisture balance within the electrochemical cells, (i.e., prbvent
flooding or dryout) the temperature differential between the dew point of the
incoming air and the dry bulb of the exiting air must be maintained at 10.55
±1.67K (19 ±3F) for cells charged with 61.5 ±0.5% cesium carbonate (Cs CO3) by
weight and at the nominal conditions for the CS-6. The temperature differential
signal is created by subtracting the temperature level sent from either of two
CTHCS temperature probes (901-21, -22) (one in each CTHCS section) from the
process air exhaust temperature level as measured by the redundant thermistors
in the process air sensors (875-33, -34). Using the temperature signal from the
CTHCS (equivalent, by definition, to process air inlet dew point) as a basis to
control module temperature results in automatic module temperature tracking
based on the level of the incoming process air dew point. Thus, moisture
balance is automatically maintained for the process air inlet dew point range of
278 to 282K (41 to 49F) expected from the CTHCS.
The temperature of each of the two groups of three modules is controlled separately.
Control is achieved by continuous modulation of cooling air blower speed result-
ing in a variation of cooling air flow rate over the external fins of the modules.
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Maximum cgollng air flow rate per group of three modules with a ingle blower is
9.2 x 10 m /s (195 scfm) at a maximum pressure drop of 747 N/m (3 inch water).
The total air stream in the exit portion of the air plenum also serves to cool
the load transistor mounting (876-31). The load transistor mounting is attached
to a finned mounting plate with fins extending into the exit chamber of the
plenum.
CS-6 Controllers
Electronic control circuits for the CS-6 are incorporated into two electronic
enclosures called the primary controller (871-31) and the emergency controller
(872-31). The purpose of the primary controller is to control all parameters
critical to the operation of the subsystem, to configure the subsystem in
response to mode commands from either ACE or IMS, to interface with ACE/IMS for
component overrides used in FDIA routines, to initiate shutdowns for out-of-
tolerance conditions for three subsystem parameters, and to process sensor
information for presentation to ACE/IMS via the DAU. The purpose of the emergency
controller is to shut the subsystem down should ACE/IMS, via the primary control-
ler or the primary controller itself, fail to do so. Functional block diagrams
of the primary and emergency controllers are shown in Figures 6 and 7. Table 4
identifies all subsystem shutdowns and their respective actuation levels.
Primary Controller Operation. The primary controller controls three parameters
critical to the operation of the CS-6. These parameters are module current,
process air flow rate, and process air inlet-dew-point-to-module-temperature
differential. Two control modes can be selected (by actuation of a switch
located within the primary controller), Mode A and Mode B. In Control Mode A,
the current and process air flow rate are a function of a potentiometer setting
which is initially adjusted within the primary controller to a desired, constant
level. In Control Mode B, both parameters are a function of an external 0-5 VDC
signal, which may originate from either a cabin or process air pCO2 sensor.
Module temperature control is independent of Control Mode A or B. Trim adjust-
ments are available within the primary controller to individually adjust, as may
be required, the current to each of the six modules and/or the process air flow
rates through each group of 48 cells.
In Control Mode A, the current is adjusted to 4.8 A for each 16 cell module
which results in a current density of 21.5 mA/cm (20 ASF). In Control Mode B,
current is a function of cabin pCO2 ontrolled between 333 and 373 N/m (2.5 and
2.8 mm Hg). At or below the 333 N/m (2.5 mm2Hg) pCO level, the current is
automatically adjusted to 2.7 A or 11.8 mA/cm (11 AS?). At or above the 373
N/m (2.8 Tm Hg) pCO 2 level, the current is automatically adjusted to 7.6 A or
33.4 mA/cm (31 ASF). Between the high and low pCO2 levels the current is
varied linearly between the maximum and minimum values indicated.
A closed loop speed control concept is used for the process air blowers. In
Conroj Mode A the total process air flow rate is adjusted to a constant 2.5 x
10 m /s (54 rcf). Control Mod2 B3allows the air flow rate to vary linearly
from 1.9 x 10 T /s to 3.4 10 m /s (40 scfm to 72 scfm) for a cabin pCO 2
range of 333 N/m to 373 N/m (2.5 mm Hg to 2.8 mm Hg). At lower than 33 Nm-
(2.5 mm Hg) pCO2 , the process air flow rate re ains constant at 1.9 x 10 m /s
(40 scfm) while at values gretei than 373 N/m (2.8 mm Hg), the air flow rate
remains constant at 3.4 x 10 m /s (72 scfm).
17
RYml DESCRIPTION -S PROV-
W~~0 h7SFW1
MA rO OA
-- - 1 a
__________________70 C3IM'C
OEEC7Or AlTlf(f4
Ar,~'~ ~QV~
-4l-"a I CRfEA'FVfAZ
AatarlAI SD flWB4C 11
WR- PRESENCEOJ,01AA
LL ~ ~ ~ SW frf'/n- BLCK A69A
PROJEC AfIDs Alf 00~~a OSO~f 81 OA'
____________________________________________________ 
___________ - 13 923 2)
FIGURE 6 RMAYCOTOLE LOKDIGA
RSVIION4
REY/5ED PER RDC /
CD aVI E PeR PRDC
- 
Z
m 
.
CONITIONEo SENson SHUTDOOWN Cause
5INAsL5TO DAU 5NL..S TO DAU
CTHCS
DO.w POINT
PaR os (a)
TEMPERATURE
MOOIJLE 04,S,
TRm.IsF-.. VPIDS To MOTOR
FR T AOSsTom ETDTro SHUTDOWN DR\iEN VALVES
E5s Rs TUnrm SITupA SEUUESr Vas~v 
-o SuMsosasM
5ENSORS Loic DRlvLEs 4 s"
IN Cong STEorroE
Susss-mm G is ..su's
COMFUSTIBLE .- TO
Hz PRcssav STrus SeusTo DAUPRIMARY
- CONTROLLER
AC. Powu.
DC POWER *I5VDC DC POWER II5VAC-400HaIFKog A.T SZ." O .... 4 11'r011VDC. a
FROM AT H .5VDC_. SUPPLIES.y Pow..
DTC5 II EN/ ,. I15.OD
CE. SCAN
96 CLL- RELsY -3 EC AC PowER
VOLTAAGES C-TwCONrOl ssiaN-_o DA U
QT'Y PART OR NMENCLATURE O  IATERIAL AND REFERENCE ITE
REQ'o IoENTIFYIG ND. OECRIPTIOdH SPECITICATIO OR OTE ND.
LIST OF MATIRIALS OR PARTS LIST
ic Systelfs, hic.
CS-6 EMERENCWC SUTDOwN
_________ _ CONTROLLER.BLOc. DARA.
oIU 7 C 486 D
FIGURE 7 EMERGENCY CONTROLLER BLOCK DIAGRAM
£i/e Syskist , IHc.
TABLE 4 CS-6 SHUTDOWN LEVEL SUMMARY
Shutdown Level
Parameter ACE/IMS PC(a) EC(b)
High H2 Pressure, kN/m 2 (Psig) 45 (6.5) 48 (7.0) 52 (7.5)
Low H2 Pressure, kN/m 2 (Psig) 21 (3.0) 17 (2.5) 14 (2.0)
High Combustible Gas Sensor
(Front), % H2-in-Air 1.0 1.5 2.0
High Combustible Gas Sensor
(Back), % H2-in-Air 1.0 1.5 2.0
Module to Dew Point AT, K (F)
Low 9.4 (17) - 8.9 (16)
High 11.7 (21) - 12.2 (22)
Low Cell Voltage, V -0.10 -0.25
High Transistor Temperature,
K (F) 355 (180) - 366 (200)
(a) PC = Primary Controller
(b) EC = Emergency Controller
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The speed of the cooling air blowers in the system is modulated by a composite
signal which is a function of incoming process air dew point and the module
temperature. This speed control system automatically controls module temperature
as a function of the dew point of the incoming process air.
The constant values selected for current and process air flow rate for Control
Mode A are sufficient to maintain the modules of the Space Station at 400 N/m
(3.0 mm Hg) pCO 2 or less for the SSP specified CO2 generation profile. In this
control mode the cabin volume is allowed to act as an accumulator since CO2
removal rate does not necessarily match CO2 generation rate. In Control Mode B
the removal rate of CO2 closely follows the generation rate of CO In this
mode, smaller fluctuations in cabin pCO occur since the CO2 removal rate is a
function of cabin pCO 2 , which is directly related to CO generation rate. A
higher average CO2 removal efficiency is achieved with ontrol Mode B due to the
higher average process air inlet pCO2 and higher air flows at higher current
densities.
In addition to controlling the above parameters, the primary controller sequen-
tially actuates subsystem components to place them in the proper configuration
as dictated by either an operating mode command from ACE/IMS or, by an out-of-
tolerance condition. The sequence control area contains sequences to configure
the system into Normal Mode, Shutdown Mode, Purge Mode, Dump Mode or Standby
Mode. Initiation of the proper sequence for the CS-6 to enter any mode except
Shutdown Mode can only begin upon receipt of the mode command from ACE/IMS. The
sequence for the CS-6 to enter Shutdown Mode, however, can be initiated by
either a command from ACE/IMS or by a shutdown command from within the primary
controller.
A shutdown command internal to the primary controller is initiated when crew
safety or major equipment damage (that which cannot be repaired by replacing a
LRU) are concerned and when corrective action cannot wait more than one minute
to complete. Three parameters of the CS-6 qualify. They are high or low H
pressure as sensed by the H pressure transducer and the presence of H2 being
sensed by one of the combustible gas sensors.
Low H pressure can be an indication of a H2-to-air crossover. However, no com-
bustible mixture will result even if all the H2 flowing were to mix with the
process air. High H pressure indicates a blockage, an improperly positioned
valve or possibly a leakage of the H2 or N2 supply valves into the anode gas
passages of the subsystem. If this pressure exceeds the breakthrough pressure
of the matrices of the cells, irreversible damage could occur. Hydrogen pressure
buildup can occur very rapidly and could cause damage in less than the one
minute worst case time period ACE/IMS might take to recognize this high pressure
condition and command subsystem shutdown.
External leaks of H2 to ambient may cause combustible gases to be released into
the cabin atmosphere. Immediate subsystem shutdown is required to prevent
localized H2-in-air buildup beyond the explosive limit (4% H -in-air). Combus-
tible gas sensors are mounted in two locations on the subsysiem, above H2
carrying components in the rear of the subsystem and above similar components in
the front of the subsystem. A sensor from each location is routed to the
circuits of the primary controller for shutdown.
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The quantit tive values at which primary controller iPitiated shutdowns occur
are 48 kN/m (7.0 psig) for high H pressure, 17 kN/m (2.5 psig) for low H2
pressure, as sensed by the pressure transducer (877-31), and a 1.5% H2-in-air
mixture ratio as sensed by either the front (178-03) or rear (178-01) located
combustible gas sensor.
During all mode transitions that result in the CS-6 being configured into the
Shutdown Mode, the low pressure shutdown signal is inhibited prior to depressur-
ization of the anode gas compartments. This prevents an emergency controller
shutdown sequence from being initiated each time that the subsystem is being
shut down. The high H2 pressure and the combustible gas sensor signals are
never inhibited.
A number of circuits in the primary controller are grouped together to function
as an Interface Unit (IU). The IU provides the required optical isolation for
all input commands from ACE/IMS and retains all mode commands in a solid-state
memory. The IU is designed such that all component override commands must be
continuous while all mode commands must have a minimum time duration of 100
milliseconds. The IU also interfaces with the signals from ACE/IMS indicating
which one of the two sections within the CTHCS is operating, provides the
master/slave circuitry for interfacing with the DAU and provides a clock interface
between ACE and the primary controller cell voltage multiplexer.
A cell voltage multiplexer is contained in the primary controller. This multi-
plexer presents the 96-cell voltages to the DAU as three groups of 32. The cell
group being sent to the DAU can change upon command from the Digital Test
Command Sequencer (DTCS) (part of ACE) or upon receiving a pulse from an internal
clock within the primary controller. The recommended multiplex command rate
from the DTCS is one clock pulse every 10 seconds. All three cell groups
therefore, are monitored every 30 seconds. Also sent to the DAU from the
multiplexer are two digital bits identifying which of the three groups of cell
information is being sent to ACE/IMS.
Additional circuits are located in the primary controller to process information
sent to ACE/IMS. The types of information processed by these circuits are
analog items such as process air flow, module temperature and process air blower
speed. In addition, digital information is processed by the primary controller
to indicate to ACE/IMS shutdown causes and system mode status.
Emergency Controller Operation. The major functional part of the emergency con-
troller is a shutdown sequencer which provides for proper component sequencing
during an emergency controller initiated subsystem shutdown. Out-of-tolerance
condition for any one of eight independent subsystem parameters can cause the
emergency controller to initiate a shutdown sequence. The first condition is a
high or low differential between the module temperature and the dew point
temperature of the inlet process air. The module temperature is compared
against the dew point temperature from the CTHCS subsystem and if the module
temperature either exceeds a level of 12.2K (22F) above the dew point temperature
of the inlet process air, or drops to less than 8.9K (16F) above the dew point
temperature, the shutdown sequence will be initiated in the emergency controller.
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Each of the two sections (a ) in the subsystem have separate high and low tempera-
ture differential shutdowns. A shutdown command from either section, however,
will shut down the total subsystem. The second condition to cause an automatic
shutdown is when the power transistors in the primary controller heat sink
assembly heat up to over 366K (200F). The third condition is the detection of
a greater than 2% H -in-air mixture sensed by a combustible gas sensor (178-37)
located in the froni of the subsystem. The fourth is caused by a similar H2-in-
air percentage sensed by a combustible gas sensor (178-02) located in the rear
of the subsystem. The fifth condition is the det ction of a H2 exhaust pressure
(pressure transducer 877-33) in excess of 52 kN/m (7.5 psig) which shuts the
subsystem down without a N2 purge. The sixth condition for a shutdown is the
detection of the loss of primary controller power2 The seventh condition for a
shutdown is H exhaust pressure less than 14 kN/m (2.0 psig), again detected by
LRU 877-33. he eighth emergency controller initiated shutdown is caused by the
detection of low cell voltage in any one of the 96 cells. Cell voltage scanning
circuits automatically and continuously scan each of the 96 cells and if any of
the cell voltages drop below -0.25V, the shutdown sequence in the emergency
controller will be initiated.
The emergency controller provides an inhibit signal to the primary controller as
soon as an emergency controller shutdown sequence has been initiated. Once the
emergency controller shutdown sequence has been started, it is carried through
to completion. After the shutdown sequence is initiated or after it is completed,
the only means by which the emergency controller can be reset is by removing
emergency power. The emergency controller sends outputs to ACE/IMS via the DAU
to indicate when the controller is in the shutdown mode and which parameter has
initiated the subsystem shutdown.
Subsystem Interfaces
The CS-6 removes CO2 from the cabin atmosphere and delivers it premixed with H
to the CRS (Sabatier Reactor). At this interface, the nominal supply rate of 2
to the CRS in the CS-6 exhaust gas stream is 0.036 kg/h (0.079 lb/hr) while the
nominal CO supply rate is 0.25 kg/h (0.55 lb/hr). The CS-6/CRS interface
requires t at the ACE/IMS computer system recognize when the CRS is not operating
and configure the CS-6 into the Dump Mode.
The H2 required for the operation of the CS-6 is supplied by the OGS. The
nominal H2 consumption rate for the CS-6 is 0.0166 kg/h (0.0365 lb/hr) and the
dew point of the H gas stream is 262K (13F). The CS-6/OGS interface also
requires that the iCE/IMS computer system recognize when the OGS is not operating
and configure the CS-6 in Shutdown Mode.
The process air for the CS-6 is supplied by the CTHCS which controls the tempera-
ture and the dew point temperature of the incoming process air. Precise control
of these two parameters is essential for optimum CS-6 operation.
A supply source of N2 is also a required interface for the CS-6. Nitrogen is
used as the purge gas for all safety-required purging of the subsystem. The
(a) Section one consists of submodules 890-31, -32 and -33. Section two con-
sists of submodules 890-34, -35 and -36.
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required N2 flow rate for a nominal2two minute purge is 0.68 kg/h (1.50 lb/hr)
at a regulated pressure of 207 kN/m (30 psig).
Commands to the CS-6 subsystem as well as data acquisition are handled by an
electrical interface with the ACE/IMS computer. There are 42 separate command
stimuli required of the ACE/IMS computer system and 126 pieces of measurement
data sent out to the ACE/IMS computer system via the DAU. A listing of the CS-6
measurement data mix is shown in Table 5.
A complete definition of all functional interfaces is found in Engineering
Report ER-170-39, "The Electrochemical CO2 Concentrating Subsystem Interface
Specifications for the SSP."
Hardware Description
The CS-6 was designed and fabricated based on a LRU concept. All major components
such as modules, blowers, valves, etc. can be easily maintained using minimum
tools, fluid line quick-connects and electrical connectors. The total subsystem
consists of a series of LRUs mounted in a supporting structure with interconnec-
ting plumbing and wiring. Figure 8 shows a front view and Figure 9 a back view
of the complete CS-6 subsystem. The overall size of the CS-6 is 1.51 m (5.0 ft)
in height by 0.62 m (2.3 f ) in width by 0.71 m (2.3 ft) in depth. The resulting
volume is 0.73 m (J6.5 ft ). T1e CS-6 weighs 368 kg (809 ib) for a packaging
density of 497 kg/m (30.5 lb/ft ). The CS-6 is subdivided into 15 LRUs as
shown in Table 6. A short functional description of each LRU follows.
1. Electrochemical Module (SSP Item 890) - The electrochemical module
removes CO2 from the process air. This is done via an overall reaction
of:
02 + 2CO2 + 2H2 = 2CO 2 + 2H20 + Elec. Energy + Heat (1)
Figure 10 shows the electrochemical module.
2. Cooling Air Blower (SSP Item 345) - The cooling air blowers draw air
from the subsystem air plenum over external fins of the electrochemical
modules to maintain module temperature at the desired level. Figure
11 shows a cooling air blower.
3. Process Air Blower (SSP Item 543) - The process air blowers draw air
through the electrochemical modules. The blowers are located down-
stream of the modules to eliminate the effects of air temperature rise
caused by blower heat generation. Figure 11 shows a process air blower.
4. Combustible Gas Sensor (SSP Item 178) - The combustible gas sensors
sense leaks in H2-carrying components and verify complete subsystem
purging. Figure 12 shows a combustible gas sensor.
5. Process Air Sensor (SSP Item 875) - A process air sensor is mounted at
the air inlet to each section of electrochemical modules and another
at the process air exhaust of each section of modules. The inlet
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TABLE 5 CS-6 MEASUREMENT DATA MIX
Type or Range of Measurement Quantity
0 to +5 VDC 48
-0.5 to +1.250 VDC 32
Frequency 2
0/5V discrete 44
Total Pieces of Data 126
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Data Acquisition
Unit, 970-4
Load Transistor
Mountig, 0
Process Air Blower,
543-32
Electrical Shutoff 543-31
Valve
305-34
305-3S
305-33
Process Ai7 Sensor,
Electrochemical Module, 875-31
890-31,-32,-33 
853
890-34,-35,-3
Primary Controller, 
. Emergency nrolr
FIGURE 8 CS-6 SUBSYSTEM (FRONT)
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FIGURE 9 CS-6 SUBSYSTEM (BACK)
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TABLE 6 CS-6 LINE REPLACEABLE UNITS
Qty. LSI SSP
Item No. Part No. Description/Title/Name Dwg. No. Item No.
1 6 410 Module, Electrochemical LSI-J-410 890-31
890-32
890-33
890-34
890-35
890-36
2 2 N/A a ) Blower, Process Air 543-31
543-32
(a)3 2 N/A Blower, Cooling Air 345-31
345-32
4 4 501 Sensor, Process Air LSI-D-501 875-31
875-32
875-33
875-34
5 3 N/A a ) Valve, Shutoff, Electric, 305-33
Manual Override 305-34
305-35
6 6 N/A~aJ Valve, Shutoff, Electric, 306-07
Manual Override 306-08
306-30
306-37
306-38
306-39
7 2 437 Mounting, H2 Flow & LSI-D-437 882-31
Distribution 882-32
8 1 N/A~a )  Valve, Regulator, 310-32
(a) Backpressure9 2 N/A Sensor, Pressure 877-31
877-33
10 4 N/A~aJ Sensor, Combustible Gas 178-01
178-02
178-03
178-37
11 1 440 Controller, Primary LSI-J-440 871-31
12 1 442 Controller, Emergency LSI-E-442 872-31
13 1 N/A Unit, Data Acquisition LSI-A-451 970-4
14 1 475 Mounting Load Transistors LSI-D-475 876-31
15 1 N/A(a) Valve, Shutoff Manual 507-32
(a) N/A = Not Applicable
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sensor measures air flow rate and air inlet temperature. The process
air sensor at the exhaust of the modules measures process air exhaust
temperature and detects any liquid entrained in the exhaust air
stream of the modules. Figure 12 shows a process air sensor.
6. Pressure Sensor (SSP Item 877) - The function of the pressure sensor
is to sense the pressure in the H2 inlet line and the H2 + CO2 outlet
lines to insure that both pressure levels are within specifications.
Figure 12 shows a pressure sensor.
7. Manual Override, Electric Shutoff Valve (SSP Item 306) - The manual
override, electric shutoff valve opens and closes various gas paths as
required during the operation of the subsystem. Figure 13 shows a
manual override, electric shutoff valve.
8. Manual Shutoff Valve (SSP Item 507) - The manual shutoff valve provides
manual isolation from vacuum of the subsystem H2 + CO2 exhaust, when
required. Figure 13 shows a manual shutoff valve.
9. Manual Override, Electric Shutoff Valve (SSP Item 305) - The manual
override, electric shutoff valve opens and closes the process air
paths as required during the operation of the subsystem. Figure 13
shows a manual override, electric shutoff valve (305).
10. Backpressure Regulator Valve (SSP Item 310) - The backpressure regula-
tor valve insures that the exhaust from the six modules is kept at a
constant backpressure. Figure 14 shows the backpressure regulator
valve.
11. H2 Flow and Distribution Mounting (SSP Item 882) - The H2 flow and2 2distribution mounting divides the H2 flow into three equal portions
through the use of fixed orifices and senses the H2 flow rate in each
of the three parallel paths. Figure 14 shows a H2 flow and distribu-
tion mounting.
12. Primary Controller (SSP Item 871) - The primary controller controls
all functions critical to the operation of the subsystem and inter-
faces with the SSP Data Management System. Figure 15 shows the
primary controller.
13. Emergency Controller (SSP Item 872) - The emergency controller shuts
down the subsystem should any parameters reach levels where crew
safety could be compromised or where equipment could be permanently
damaged. Figure 15 shows the emergency controller.
14. Load Transistor Mounting (SSP Item 876) - The load transistor mounting
provides for an air-cooled mounting of the load transistors required
in the closed loop current control system for the electrochemical
modules. Figure 15 shows the load transistor mounting.
15. Data Acquisition Unit (SSP Item 970) - The DAU selects, conditions,
and digitizes its complement of input signals, and stores them for
subsequent output to the ACE/IMS Data Management System.
32
FIGURE 13 ELECTRIC SHUTOFF VALVE (306), MANUAL SHUTOFF VALVE
AND ELECTRIC SHUTOFF VALVE (305)
Hydrogen Flow Sensor
and Distribution Mounting
Backpressure
Regulator
FIGURE 14 BACKPRESSURE REGULATOR AND H2 FLOW AND DISTRIBUTION MOUNTING
2r
Primary Controller
Emergency Controller
Load Transistor
FIGURE 15 PRIMARY CONTROLLER, LOAD TRANSISTOR MOUNTING
AND EMERGENCY CONTROLLER
........ .  ... ....
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PRODUCT ASSURANCE PROGRAM
The Product Assurance Program implemented for the design, development, fabrica-
tion, assembly and testing of the CS-6 included Quality Control, Reliability,
Maintainability, Materials Control, and Safety.
Quality Control
The Quality Control functions performed during the design, development, fabrica-
tion, assembly and testing of the CS-6 were the following:
1. Preparation of the Quality Assurance Program Plan for the CS-6 (ER-
170-8A).
2. Performance and documentation of receiving, in-process and final
inspections of all CS-6 components received and manufactured.
3. Maintenance of records of all supplier inspections and certifications
of all non-conforming items, and corrective actions.
4. Maintenance of configuration control by ensuring that the Life Systems
Drawing and Change Control procedures were followed.
5. Monitoring of component and subsystem DVTs and of the final Subsystem
Acceptance Test. This included review of test plans and test results.
6. Monitoring electrical engineering conformance to NASA/Ames Reliability
and Quality Assurance Requirement, Q-11, "Electrical/Electronic
Equipment and Assemblies."
7. Participation in design reviews.
8. Preparation of the Acceptance Data Log (see Table 7).
Reliability
The reliability tasks performed are listed below.
Reliability Math Model and Block Diagram
A reliability analysis (ER-170-14B) was performed on the CS-6 design. The
reliability goal for the CCS of the SSP ETC/LSS was 0.999750 for a two-year
mission with 180 day resupply intervals. The analysis revealed that in order to
exceed the reliability goal, spares as listed in Table 8, would be required. The
spared reliability of the CS-6 is 0.999979. The expected number of failures for
the 180-day mission profile is 0.870; this results in a Mean-Time-Between-
Failure (MTBF) of 4,966 hours.
Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)
The FMECA (ER-170-16B) presents all hypothesized equipment failure modes and
classifies each according to criticality as listed below.
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TABLE 7 ACCEPTANCE DATA LOG CONTENTS
1. As-Built Configuration List ER-170
-11a (a)
2. Assembly/Inspection Record ER-170-11b
3. Rejection and Rework Record ER-170-11c
4. Design Verification and Electrochemical CO2
Collection Subsystem Level Test Procedures
and Data ER-170-11d
5. Design Verification and Electrochemical CO2
Collection Subsystem Level Test Failure
Reports ER-170-lle
6. Waiver/Deviations ER-170-llf
7. DD Form 250 ER-170-llg
(a) Life Systems, Inc. Engineering Report
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TABLE 8 SPARES LIST
LSI
SSP Item Part Launch
No. Number Name Spares
890 410 Module, Electrochemical 2
None None Electrochemical Cells 4 (a)
305 N/A(b) Valve, Shutoff, Electric, Manual Override 3
875 501 Sensor, Process Air 2
543 N/A Blower, Process Air 3
178 N/A Sensor, Combustible Gas 3
306 N/A Valve, Shutoff, Electric, Manual Override 4
882 437 Mounting, H2 Flow & Distribution 2
877 N/A Sensor, Pressure 3
310 N/A Valve, Regulator, Backpressure 2
345 N/A Blower, Cooling Air 3
871 440 Controller, Primary 2
872 442 Controller, Emergency 2
876 475 Mounting, Load Transistors 2
(a) Four electrochemical cells can be maintained insitu without altering
module performance.
(b) N/A = Not Applicable
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Criticality
I A single failure which could cause loss of personnel.
IIa A single failure whereby the next associated failure could
cause loss of personnel.
IIb A single failure whereby the next associated failure could
cause return of one or more personnel to earth or loss of
subsystem function(s) essential to continuation of space
operations and scientific investigation.
III A single failure which could not result in loss of primary
or secondary mission objectives or adversely affect crew
safety.
The analysis was used to identify safety hazards and single failure points and
was used in conjunction with the FDIA to ensure that instrumentation for complete
fault isolation was included in the subsystem design. An example of an FMECA is
presented in Figure 16.
The FMECA identified 11 criticality IIa failure modes. Eight are associated
with external leakage of the components in the H2 or H + CO2 lines. Two are
associated with H2 crossover in the electrochemical modules. The other is the
"fail low" failure mode of the combustible gas sensors.
Single Point Failure Analysis (SPFA)
A single point failure is a single failure which could cause loss of personnel,
could cause return of one or more men to earth or could make it possible for the
next associated failure to cause loss of personnel (Criticality I and IIa failure
modes of the FMECA).
An SPFA (ER-170-17B) was performed on the CS-6 for three hazardous failure
modes:
1. external H2 leakage from all components and fittings in the H2
lines,
2. gas crossover in the electrochemical modules, and
3. combustible gas detector failure exhibiting a continually low output
reading.
The SPFA described the safety consequences of each hazardous failure mode,
documented the corrective action taken to minimize the hazard and detailed the
justification for retaining the hazard.
Failure Reporting Procedure/Reliablility Data Reports
A Failure Reporting Procedure (ER-170-18) was prepared to establish and document
the requirements for reporting, investigating and correcting component and
subsystem failures during DVT and Acceptance Testing of the subsystem.
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C C 8Syte WS .PAGE REVISION£ -e ysfefsf, ffcf. FAILURE MODE, EFFECTS OF LTR.
CLEVELAND, OHIO 44122 & CRITICALITY ANALYSIS DATE
TITLE 0 SUBSYSTEM
VALVE, SHUTOFF, ELECTRICAL, MANUAL OVERRIDE ITEM 305-33.34. 10 LOOP WCOMPONENT
PART RELIABILITY 35
NO. LOGIC NO.
430 21 E 24 Electrical Shutoff To isolate the electrochemical modules
valve with manual in the event of cabin depressurization
override
FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE: CRITICALITY
a) fail open III
b) fail closed III
c) external leakage III
FAILURE EFFECT ON COMPONENT/FUNCTIONAL ASSEMBLY:
a) air flows through valve at all times
b) air flow through the valve ceases
c) cabin air leaks into process air stream through the valve
FAILURE EFFECT ON SYSTEM/SUBSYSTEM:
a) Unable to isolate the electrochemical modules in the event of cabin
depressurization. Module moisture balance would be lost. All modules
would have to be replaced.
b) Unable to start CO2 collection function after depressurization until
maintenance on 305 valve is performed.
c) none
FAILURE DETECTION METHOD:
a) Fault Detection Isolation Analysis A.1.2
b) Fault Detection Isolation Analysis A.1.1
c) None, except if valve also leaks when in closed position. If so, then it is
impossible to isolate the electrochemical modules in the event of cabin depress-
urization. Module Moisture balance would be lost.
CREW ACTION REQUIRED: TIME TIME
a) Close 305 valve using manual override, replace 305 valve before REQD. AVAIL.
restarting subsystem 24 min
b) Replace 305 valve 5 min
c) Replace 305 valve 5 min
FIGURE 16 FAILURE MODE, EFFECTS AND CRITICALITY ANALYSIS
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A Reliability Data Report (ER-170-19) was prepared for the four component
failures that occurred during the DVT and Acceptance Testing of the CS-6. The
four failures were:
1. A process air blower (SSP Item 543) failed when the set screw holding
the rotor to the blower shaft became loose and allowed the rotor to
contact the blower housing.
2. A microswitch on motor-driven N2 purge valve (SSP Item 306-08) failed.
The microswitch was not sensing that the valve was in the closed
position.
3. Both motor-driven N purge valves (SSP Items 306-07 and3306-08)
exhibited internal teakage. 2The leak rate was 0.167 cm /s (10 sccm)
at a N2 pressure of 207 kN/m (30 psig).
4. Combustible gas sensor (SSP Item 178-03) failed with its output contin-
ually reading low. The sensor read -3.17 volts in all tested 
atmo-
spheres (e.g., 0.5% H2-in-air and 1.9% H2-in-air).
Fault Detection/Isolation Analysis (FDIA)
A FDIA (ER-170-25B) was performed on the CS-6. The purpose of the FDIA was to
establish the instrumentation requirements for complete automatic fault detection
and isolation of each LRU and to document, in the form of block diagrams, the
logic required to isolate a malfunction. Work on the softwar ~1 ackage 
ceased at
the 80% complete level as a result of the SSP program replan.
The FDIA logic consists of four routines: a Mode Test, a Monitoring Routine for
the mode in which the CS-6 is operating, a Monitoring Logic Routine for Continu-
ously Monitored Parameters, and a Fault Isolation Routine. The Mode 
Test
Routine and examples of the Monitoring Logic for Continously Monitored Parameters
Routine and the Fault Isolation Routine are presented in Figures 17, 18 and 19,
respectively.
Maintainability
The maintainability activities performed in conjunction with the design of the
CS-6 were:
1. Participation in design and mock-up reviews to ensure that the SSP
maintainability guidelines were satisfied.
2. Documentation of design features that result in increased MTBF or
decreased maintenance time (e.g., subsystem overdesign, equipment
protection features, labeling of LRUs, etc.). These are documented in
the Maintainability Analysis Summary Report (ER-170-24).
3. Preparation of CS-6 Operation and Maintenance Manual (ER-170-36).
A maintenance summary describing the tools required, maintenance access, and
maintenance time required is presented in Table 9. An example LRU maintenance
procedure is listed in Figure 20.
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A. 1.1.3 A.I.1.5
A~L -TOM 43S>TBD RPM? SC-301SX-OV, SC-3016X-OV, SC-3019X-OV, -3020XV, ,REPLACE 875-2,
PR S 8 CF., W 543-32 BLOWER SPEE (305-33 OPEN)? (305-33 CLOSED)? (305-35 OPEN)? (305-35 CLOSED)? AIR FLOW SENSORC IR FLOW! - ..-- HAS FAILED LOW
875-32, IS LOW
No yes yes
ACE, COMAND REPLACE 305-35,
543-32 BLOWER VALVE CONTACTS VALVE COACTS
'_VECOTATS VLECNAT
TO TURN ON WELDED WELDED
KC-3102
is ISACE REOVE REPLACE PRIMARY
-3043S)TBD RPM? yes 543 32 OVERRIDE, CONTROLLER,
K C-3103 I 876-31
No
ACE, REMOVE
543-32 OVERRIDE,
KC-3103
REPLACE
PROCESS AIR
BLOWER,
ITEM NO. 543-32
REVISION
Icle Soo ft Ic. FAULT ISOLATION NO. A.1.10 LTR.
CLEVELAND. OHIO 44122 LOGIC PAGE 1 OF 1 1-5-73
TITLE PROCESS AIR FLOW RATE LOW TO SECTION 2 MODULES
FIGURE 19 CS-6 SAMPLE FAULT ISOLATION ROUTINE
TABLE 9 MAINTENANCE SUMMARY
Tools Maintenance Time
SSP Item No. LSI Part No. Description Req'd(a) Access Req'd
890 410 Module, Electrochemical 2,5,6 Front 0.3 hr
543 NA(b) Blower, Process Air 4 (c) Front 0.2 hr
345 NA Blower, Cooling Air NR(d) Rear 0.1 hr
875 501 Sensor, Process Air 4 (c) Front (2),
Rear (2) 0.1 hr
877 NA Sensor, Pressure 7 Rear 0.1 hr
178 NA Sensor, Combustible Gas 4(c) Front (2)
Rear (2) 0.1 hr
305 NA Valve, Shutoff, Electric NR Front 0.1 hr
306 NA Valve, Shutoff, Electric 3,4
(c )  Rear 0.1 hr
(c)
507 NA Valve, Shutoff, Manual 3,4 Rear 
0.1 hr
882 437 Mounting, H2 Flow Sensor and
Distribution 2,3,4 Rear 0.1 hr
310 NA Regulator, Backpressure 3,4(c) Rear 0.1 hr
871 440 Controller, Primary NR Front 0.1 hr
872 442 Controller, Emergency NR Front 0.1 hr
970 NA Unit, Data Acquisition NR Front 0.1 hr
876 475 Mounting, Load Transistor 1 Front 0.1 hr
(a) Tools Required:
1. 3/16" Allen Wrench 5. 7/16" Socket with Driver
2. 5/8" Open-end Wrench 6. 7/16" Socket with Torque Driver
3. 13/16" Open-end Wrench 7. Special 3/4" Open-end Wrench
4. 3/8" Socket Driver
(b) NA - Not Applicable
(c) Tool No. 1 may be substituted for No. 4.
(d) NR - None Required
Zile Systems, 6C.
LRU Title: Blower, Process Air
SSP Item No.: 543
LSI Part No.: N/A
No. Required: 2
Subsystem SSP Item Nos.: 543-31 and -32
Tools Required: 3/8" Socket Driver
Maintenance Access: Front
Time Required: 0.2 hours
Special Precautions: Blower housing may be hot
Procedure
A. Removal
A.1 Initiate shutdown mode and remove system power (see Operating
instructions).
A.2 Locate failed blower in CS-6.
A.3 Detach the two electrical connectors by rotating counter-
clockwise.
A.4 Release retaining clamps at the air inlet and outlet connections
of the blower using 3/8" socket driver.
A.5 Remove blower by loosening the four (4) mounting bolts using
3/8" socket driver.
B. Installation
B.1 Identify location for new blower installation.
B.2 Utilizing 3/8" socket driver, attach the blower to system
frame with mounting bolts but do not tighten.
B.3 Align retaining clamps at air inlet and outlet connections
and secure using 3/8" driver.
B.4 Tighten blower mounting bolts with the 3/8" driver.
B.5 Attach the two electrical connectors by pushing forward
and rotating clockwise.
FIGURE 20 PROCESS AIR BLOWER MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
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Nonmetallic Materials Control
The objective of the Nonmetallic Materials Control Program was to identify all
nonmetallic materials present in the CS-6. These were screened for accepta-
bility to CSD-SS-012, "Nonmetallic Materials Requirements for Manned Testing of
the Space Station Prototype Environmental/Thermal Control and Life Support
System." Unacceptable materials were either (1) replaced by acceptable alternates,
(2) protected by a nonflammable coating and tested for acceptance in this confi-
guration, (e.g., Fluorel coated Nopco G 306 SE foam), or (3) tested for acceptance
in its "as used" configuration.
For those materials that did not meet the requirements of CSD-SS-012 and for
which acceptable alternate materials could not be found, a Nonmetallic Materials
Requirement Waiver was prepared.
The Nonmetallic Materials List (ER-170-28E) and Nonmetallic Materials Requirement
Waiver (ER-170-29C) were submitted to NASA JSC for Material Review Board (MRB)
action. Complete approval for the nonmetallic materials present in the CS-6 was
obtained. A sample nonmetallic materials list is shown in Figure 21.
Safety
The Safety Program was carried out in conjunction with the design and development
of the CS-6 and consisted of:
1. Preparation of the CS-6 Safety Design Criteria (ER-170-67) and monitor-
ing of subsystem and component design for compliance to the Safety
Design Criteria.
2. Identification of dangerous subsystem characteristics and failure
modes. This was done in conjunction with the FMECA performed on the
system.
3. Performance of a Safety Hazard Analysis (SHA) (ER-170-27C) for all
Criticality I and IIa failure modes.
4. Review of the Nonmetallic Materials Lists and the Nonmetallic Materials
Waivers Requests.
5. Review of designs and design changes for potential safety problems.
6. review of NASA Alerts for safety information.
7. Review of test plans and procedures having safety significance.
8. Work in conjunction with subsystem designers and program management to
reduce Safety Catastrophic and Safety Critical Hazards to the Safety
Negligible category. A definition of Safety Hazard Categories is
presented in Table 10.
9. Review of Reliability Data Reports (failure reports) for their impact
on safety.
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FIGURE 21 CS-6 SAMPLE NONMETALLIC MATERIALS LIST
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TABLE 10 HAZARD CATEGORIES
Four hazard categories are defined for condition(s) such that environment,
personnel error, design characteristics, procedural deficiencies, subsystem
failure or component malfunction will cause or result in the following:
Hazard Category Will Cause or Result In
1. Safety Catastrophic Condition(s) such that environment, personnel
error, design characteristics, procedural defi-
ciencies, subsystem failure or component mal-
function will cause death or incapacitating in-
juries to personnel by severe degradation of
system performance or subsequent system loss.
2. Safety Critical Condition(s) such that environment, personnel
error, design characteristics, procedural defi-
ciencies, subsystem failure or component mal-
function will cause personnel injury or serious
damage to other equipment, which will result
in a hazard requiring immediate corrective action
for personnel or system survival.
3. Safety Marginal Condition(s) such that environment, personnel
error, design characteristics, procedural defi-
ciencies, subsystem failure or component mal-
function will degrade system performance but
which can be counteracted or controlled without
major damage or any injury to personnel.
4. Safety Negligible Conditions(s) such that personnel error, design
characteristics, procedural deficiencies, or
subsystem failure or component malfunction will
not result in major system degradations, and
will not produce system functional damage or
personnel injury.
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An example of a SHA, which details the method of detecting the hazard, the
backup provisions provided to ensure safety, the corrective action available to
the crew to correct the hazardous condition and the equipment failure mode that
can create the hazard is presented in Figure 22.
GROUND SUPPORT ACCESSORIES
Various items of support equipment were designed, built and/or modified to
supply the process fluids, including process and cooling air, the electrical
power and the command and data display interface required for Shakedown, Design
Verification, and Acceptance Testing of the CS-6. Four GSA were provided:
1. Fluid Supply Unit (FSU)
2. Air Supply Unit (ASU)
3. Power Supply Unit (PSU)
4. Ground Support Panel (GSP)
Fluid Supply Unit
The FSU controls and monitors the flows and pressures of gases used by the CS-6
and the ASU. The FSU supplies gases to the ASU and the CS-6 for the following
requirements:
ASU
* CO2 - to maintain desired pCO 2 in the CS-6 process air
* Air - to maintain desired total air pressure (leakage makeup for
closed-loop operation)
CS-6
* H2 - for depolarization of the cell anodes
* N - for purging of H lines and anode gas cavities prior to
siartup or during shu down of the unit
Air Supply Unit
The ASU supplies process air to the CS-6 at the desired pCO 2, temperature and
dew point. The major components of the ASU are a cabin simulator tank, a tem-
perature and humidity controller, instrumentation, piping and valves. The
process air loop through the CS-6 and the ASU can be operated as either a
closed or open loop. In the closed loop operation, air is recirculated and only
makeup gases are added. In open loop operation, the ASU conditions ambient air
to the desired pCO , temperature and dew point with the process air exiting the
CS-6 returned to ambient. All testing of the CS-6 was done under open loop
operation. In addition to the requirement for process air, CS-6 testing required
a source of cooling air which was supplied by a ground support air conditioner.
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Equipment Involved
All components, valves and fittings in the hydrogen (H2) gas line. Also the
O-ring and gasket seals in the modules.
Hazard Description Hazard Category (per Safety
Manual OP-108)
Hydrogen leak into the cabin atmosphere.
Marginal
Equipment Usage/Mission Phase
Provides for H2 supply to the electrochemical modules during all manned phases
of a mission or manned chamber test.
Method of Detecting Hazard
All H2 components are contained within a confined region'of the CS-6. Four
combustible gas sensors are mounted within the envelope at strategic locations
to detect the presence of H 
. 
The output of the four sensors is monitored
every two seconds by ACE/IMS. When H in excess of 1.0% is indicated by any
one sensor, the subsystem will be shui down.
The H flow sensors and the triply redundant H pressure sensors are also
used to detect external leakage of H2 components.
LSI Equipment Action
External leakage failure mode of all components in the H line caused the
hazard. A minor leak in a confined area can lead to an A2-air mixture above
the explosive limit.
Backup Provisions
Two of the combustible gas sensors are wired to the primary controller and two
are wired to the emergency controller. The primary and emergency controllers
act as a backup for ACE/IMS. They will shut down the CS-6 when H2 is in excess
of 1.5% and 2.0%, respectively, is indicated by a combustible gas sensor.
In addition, the H2 loop is proof-tested to six times the design operating
pressure.
Corrective Action Available to Crewmen
Verify that the CS-6 has been shut down and purged. Locate the leaking compon-
ent utilizing nitrogen (N2 ) gas and the ultrasonic leak detector. Replace the
faulty component.
FIGURE 22 CS-6 SAMPLE SAFETY ANALYSIS
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Power Supply Unit
The PSU provides electrical power to the CS-6. This power is in the form of a
nominal 115/208 VRMS 30, 400 Hz WYE connected supply. The PSU is an uninter-
ruptible supply normally using 60 Hz ground based power. In the event of a
ground based power failure, the storage batteries contained in the PSU continue
to supply the power required which allows the CS-6 to continue operation during
a short ground based power outage.
Ground Support Panel
The GSP monitors, displays and controls various key functions of the CS-6. It
is mounted in place of the DAU and allows manual control and testing of the CS-
6 without the DAU or the ACE/IMS Data Management System.
The GSP provides capabilities to (1) select the desired operating mode of the
CS-6, (2) override open or closed all subsystem motor-driven valves, (3)
override "on" each of the subsystem's four blowers, (4) set the desired CO
removal rate, process air flow rate, and module-CTHCS temperature differential,
and (5) advance the cell scan multiplexer.
The GSP provides data display of the following information:
1. Module Voltage
2. Module Current
3. Module Temperature
4. CTHCS Temperature
5. Process Air Temperature
6. Process Air Flow Rate
7. Blower Speeds
8. Shutdown Causes
9. Combustible Gas Sensor Levels
10. H Pressure
11. Valve Positions
12. Controller Status Information (both Primary and Emergency)
13. Controller Bias Voltage Levels
Figure 23 shows the GSP mounted on the CS-6.
TEST PROGRAM
System testing of the CS-6 consisted of three major phases: (1) Shakedown Tests,
(2) Design Verification Tests (DVT), and (3) Acceptance Tests. In addition to
system testing, component testing and sensor calibration was performed. All
functional CS-6 testing was done at SSP operating conditions.
Tests were run on the CS-6 to verify previous component data and to obtain data
on component interfaces for a program mathematicall 3 odeling a Six-Man, Self-
Contained, Electrochemical Concentrating Subsystem. Figures 24, 25 and 26
are plots of the variation in CO2 removal efficiency, expressed as the Transfer
Index (TI), as a function of pCO 2 , current density, and air flow rate, respectively.
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Ground Support
Panel
FIGURE 23 GSP MOUNTED ON CS-6
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FIGURE 24 EFFECT OF pCO 2 ON TI AND AVERAGE CELL VOLTAGE
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FIGURE 25 EFFECT OF CURRENT DENSITY ON TI AND AVERAGE CELL VOLTAGE
-0 0.
O ---
Operating Time, h : 250
Number of Cells : 96
1.5 Current, A : 4.88
0 Electrolyte : Cs CO
Charge Concentration, % : 61.5
Temperature, K (F) : 292 (66)
Air Inlet Dew Point, K (F) : 282 (48)
Air Pressure, kN/m 2 (Psia) : Ambient
- 1.0 Air Inlet pCO2 , N/m 2 (mm Hg) : 373 (2.8)
'Air Flow Rate, m 3/s (Scfm) : Variable
H2 Flow Rate, m3/s (S pm) : 1.67 x 10-4 (10)
H2 Backpressure, kN/m (Psia) : 135 (19.7)
0.5
0 0.015 0.020 0.025 0.030
Air Flow, m3/s
0 30 40 Air Flow, Scfm 50 60
FIGURE 26 EFFECT OF AIR FLOW RATE ON TI
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The TI is numerically equivalent to the kg (ib) of CO2 transferred per kg (ib)
of 02 consumed. Based on the overall electrochemical reaction of CO2 removal,
a TI of 2.75 is equivalent to a 100% current efficiency.
Component Checkout and Calibration Tests
Component checkout tests were performed on all CS-6 and GSA components. Calibra-
tion tests were performed on CS-6 components measuring or controlling the follow-
ing functions: combustible gas presence, H2 + CO2 backpressure and flow, module
and process air inlet temperatures, cooling and process air blower speeds,
process air flow rate, H2 and N2 flow distribution, and module current and
voltage. Calibration tests were performed on the following GSA interface simula-
tion and parameter monitoring equipment: flow meters, pressure gauges, pressure
regulators, voltmeters, ammeters and temperature and dew point indicators.
All component checkout and calibration tests were completed with all set points
based on simulated levels at the sensor input points.
Electrochemical Module Checkout Test
Prior operation of the electrochemical modules (890) verified that the CO2
removal and electrical performance exceeded the design specifications.( 4) The
checkout tests consisted of pressurizing each module to 62.0 kN/m (9.0 psig)
and creating 2a pressure differential between the anode and cathode compartments
of 51.7 kN/m (7.5 psig). An electrical leakage test was performed on each
module to determine if any shorts existed. All modules passed the electrical
and pressure checkout tests.
CS-6 Shakedown Test
All components were assembled into the self-contained subsystem and integrated
with the GSA. A shakedown test was performed on the CS-6 which resulted in the
following modifications being made:
Self-Contained Subsystem
1. An antibounce circuit for the module advance command was incorporated
into the primary controller. This eliminated noise susceptibility in
the external cell multiplex clocking function.
2. The ground return bus for the current loop was rerouted inside the
controller to eliminate instability in the current control loop.
3. Individual dampers were installed in the two cooling air return loops
in the exhaust portion of the air plenum to decrease undesirable
cooling air leakage flows across the fins of the modules.
Ground Support Accessories
1. Extremely low relative humidities were measured in the testing area
brought about by climate changes. To alleviate the seasonal problem a
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humidifier was installed upstream of the ASU to increase process air
moisture to the levels required to simulate the CTHCS interface.
2. The simulated CTHCS temperature probe was encased in an aluminum block
to dampen rapid temperature fluctuations and provide for improved
stability of temperature monitoring.
Design Verification Test
Two major parameters are used to describe the performance of the CS-6: (1) CO2removal efficiency and (2) electrical efficiency. Carbon dioxide removal effi-
ciency is reflected by the TI which is defined as the kg (lb) of CO2 removed per
kg (lb) of 02 consumed. Based on the stoichiometry of the reactions involved,
the theoretical TI is 2.75 kg CO /kg 0 Electrical efficiency is reflected by
cell voltage. Since an electrociemicai CO2 concentrator produces electrical
power, a high cell voltage reflects a high electrical efficiency. The theoreti-
cal voltage for the electrochemical reactions is 1.23 volts.
A DVT was conducted on the CS-6 to demonstrate the subsystem's capability to
remove the required amount of CO (0.25 kg CO 2/h (0.55 lb CO 2/hr)) at baseline
operating conditions and to estailish electrical (cell voltage) and CO2 removal
(TI) efficiencies. This DVT consisted of operating the subsystem at baseline
conditions for a minimum of 100 hours (cumulative) and recording data three
times per day during normal working hours. Baseline operating conditions are
outlined in Table 11. Figure 27 shows average cell voltage, pCO 2 of the process
inlet air, TI, and the amount of CO2 removed in kg/h (ib/hr) as a function of
operating time for a part of the CS-6 DVT consisting of 48 hours of continuous
operation. As can be seen from the figure, the average cell voltage for this
period exceeded the design value of 0.25 volts by 0.09 volts, resulting in a 10%
reduction in waste heat generation. The TI and amount of CO removed consis-
tently exceeded the design points of 1.9 kg CO /kg 02 and 0. 5 kg C02/h (0.55 lb
CO2/hr), respectively. During the DVT, special tests were performed which (1)
confirmed that the anode gas backpressure did not drop below the low pressure
shutdown level (20.7 kN/m (3 psig)) of the primary controller due to H and 0
diffusion and chemical recombination during a simulation of the 36 minuie stanby
portion (dark side of orbit) of cyclic operation following only a one minute
duration N2 purge, (2) established that the cooling air blower speed modulation
responded properly to variations in the CTHCS dew point temperature, and (3)
verified proper operation of all functional mode transitions and shutdown
protections.
Acceptance Test
Acceptance Testing of the CS-6 was necessary to insure performance at SSP base-
line conditions following the refurbishment and calibration adjustments made
after the DVT. The Acceptance Test consisted of operation of the CS-6 at nominal,
steady-state conditions for 100 hours. Uninterrupted operation was required.
Figure 28 shows TI, CO2 removal rate and average cell voltage as a function of
time during the Acceptance Test. As can be seen from the figure, the Acceptance
Test demonstrated that the CS-6 again exceeded the design baseline conditions of
a TI of 1.9, a CO2 removal rate of 0.25 kg/h (0.55 lb/hr) and an electrochemical
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TABLE 11 BASELINE OPERATING CONDITIONS
Process Air
Inlet -3
Flow Rate, m3/s (Scfm) 2.5 x 102 ±1.9 x 10 (54,±4)
Pressure, kN/m2 (Psia) 101-108 (14.6-15.7)
Dew Point, K (F) 281 ±1 (46 ±2)
Dry Bulb lemperature, K (F) 284 ±1 (52 ±2)
pCO 2, N/m (mm Hg) 387 ±13 (2.9 ±0.1)
Exhaust -2 -3
Flow Rate, m3/s (Scfm) 2.5 x 10 ±1.9 x 10 (54 ±4)
Pressure, kN/m2 (Psia) 101-108 (14.6-15.7)
Dew Point, K (F) 283 ±1 (50 ±2)
Dry Bulb Temperature
Module Exit, K (F) 291 ±1 (65 ±2)
Blower Exit, K (F) 302 +2 (85 +3)
Hydrogen 1.77 x 10 1.77 x 10 (10.6 1.06)
Flow Rate, m /s (Slpm) 1.77 x 10
Dew Point, K (F) 262-294 (13-70)
Electrochemical Module
Current, A 4.88
Temperature, K (F) 292 ±1 (66 ±1)
Electrolyte Cs 2C03
Initial Charge Concentration,
Wt % 61.5 ±0.3
Anode Gas Backpressure,
kN/m2 (Psia) 135.4 +6.9 (19.7 +1)
Nitrogen 3 4
Nitrogen Flow Rate, m /s (Slpm) 1.64 x 10
-4 +2.5 x 10-5 (9.8 ±1.5)
Regulated Nitrogen Pressure,
kN/m 2 (Psia) 207 +14, (30 +2)
Purge Duration, s (Min) 120 ±10% (2 +10%)
Frequency As Required
Cooling Air
Inlet
Dry Bulb Temperature, K (F) 284 ±1 (52 +2)
Flow Rate, m /s (Scfm), Max 1.85 x 10-1 +9.44 x 10
-3 (390 ±20)
Supply Pressure Range, N/m2
(Inch Water) Atmosphere +747-1495 (+3-6)
Exhaust
Average Dry Blub Temperature
Rise, K (F) 1.1 (1.9)
Maximum Dry Bulb Temperature
Rise, K (F) 1.9 (3.4)
Pressure Drop, N/m2
(Inch Water) 374 ±125 (1.5 ±0.5)
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cell voltage of 0.25 volts. It should be noted that the electrodes used in the
CS-6 electrochemical modules were the same as those used during shakedown,
parametric, and 180-day endurance testjgf of the CX-6, Six-man, Self-Contained
Carbon Dioxide Concentrator Subsystem. A total of 209 days of operation had,
therefore, been accumulated with these electrodes prior to their installation
into the CS-6.
SUBSYSTEM DOCUMENTATION SUMMARY
Throughout the course of the design, development, fabrication and testing of the
CS-6, many documents and drawings were generated by Life Systems, Inc. to (1)
aid in the subsystem design and the SSP interface, (2) summarize meeting results
and action items, (3) specify design requirements and test results, (4) supply
required documentation for the generation of computer software, (5) supply
required quality, reliability and fault diagnostic information, and (6) supply
other contractually required information. This documentation can best be sepa-
rated into the three areas of Design, Interface and Product Assurance. A listing
of documentation in each of the areas is shown below. Two selected examples of
CS-6 documentation, LRU Specification No. 882 for the H2 Flow and Distribution
Mounting, and Drawing LSI-D-501 for the Process Air Sensor, are included in
Appendix A. Detailed CS-6 operating and maintenance instructions are found in
the CS-6 Operations and Maintenance Manual (ER-170-36).
Design Documentation
Pertinent CS-6 design documents generated by Life Systems, Inc. were:
Document No. Title/Description
ER-170-3 CS-6 Subsystem Test Plan
ER-170-3a through f Individual CS-6 Component Test Plans
ER-170-45 Subsystem Component Specifications
ER-170-46 CO2 Collection Subsystem, Performance and Design
Requirements for Space Station Prototype
ER-170-52 CS-6 Control Philosophy
ER-170-65 CS-6 Software Tables and Logic Package
ER-170-77 CS-6 System Wiring List
ER-170-79 CS-6 Primary and Emergency Controller Wiring List
LSI-J-410 Electrochemical Module Assembly Drawing
LSI-D-417 CS-6 Schematic
LSI-C-423 CS-6 Primary Controller Block Diagram
LSI-D-437 H2 Flow and Distribution Mounting Drawing
LSI-J-440 Primary Controller Drawing
LSI-E-442 Emergency Controller Drawing
LSI-D-475 Load Transistor Mounting Drawing
LSI-C-486 CS-6 Emergency Controller Block Diagram
LSI-D-489 CS-6 Subsystem Functional Block Diagram
LSI-D-496 CS-6 Primary Controller and Rack to Supporting
Structure Installation Drawing
LSI-D-501 Process Air Sensor Drawing
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Document No. Title/Description
LSI-B-543 CS-6 Operating Modes
LSI-D-544 CS-6 Mode Transitions
LSI-B-545 CS-6 Controlled Variables, Steady-State Conditions
LSI-D-572 CS-6 Emergency Controller and Rack to Supporting
Structure Installation Drawing
Interface Documentation
Pertinent CS-6 interface documents generated by Life Systems, Inc. were:
Document No. Title/Description
ER-170-39 The Electrochemical CO2 Concentrating Subsystem
Interface Specifications for the SSP
ER-170-47 Interim Design Review Meeting Minutes
ER-170-51 Delta Interim Design Review Meeting Minutes
ER-170-56 CS-6/SSP Detailed Electrical Interface Specifica-
tion
ER-170-61 Approval Design Review Meeting Minutes
ER-170-69 Delta Approval Design Review Meeting Minutes
LSI-D-485 CS-6 CO2 Concentrator Subsystem Installation
Drawing
Product Assurance Documentation
Pertinent CS-6 Product Assurance documents generated by Life Systems, Inc. were:
Document No. Title/Description
ER-170-8 Quality Assurance Program Plan
ER-170-11 Acceptance Data Log
ER-170-14 Reliability Math Model and Block Diagram
ER-170-16 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
ER-170-17 Single Point Failure Analysis
ER-170-18 Failure Reporting Procedure
ER-170-19 Component Failure Reports
ER-170-24 Maintainability Analysis Summary Report
ER-170-25 Fault Detection/Isolation Analysis Summary Report
ER-170-27 Safety Hazard Analysis Report
ER-170-28 Nonmetallic Materials List
ER-170-29 Nonmetallic Materials Requirement Waiver
ER-170-36 CS-6 Operations and Maintenance Manual
ER-170-67 Safety Design Criteria for the CS-6
ER-170-82 CS-6 Reliability Data Reports
OP-108 System Safety Procedure
CONCLUSIONS
The following conclusions are a direct result of this development.
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1. The Six-Man, Self-Contained, CO2 Concentrating Subsystem for SSP
application is capable of 5emoving 6.0 kg (13.2 lb) C02/day with an
air inlet pCO 2 of <400 N/m (<3 mm Hg).
2. The Primary and Emergency Controllers, coupled with the ACE/IMS Data
Management System, provide fail-safe conditions for unattended operation.
3. The CS-6 is capable of operating at SSP interface specifications.
4. The CS-6, designed and built for manned chamber testing, received NASA
approval of the nonmetallic materials present in the unit.
5. The CS-6 was designed utilizing applicable SSP commonality components
including motor-operated valves, blowers, regulators and combustible
gas sensors.
6. The CS-6 was designed utilizing the LRU concept for maintainability.
7. Five specific steady-state operating modes are incorporated in the CS-
6 and were successfully demonstrated.
8. Closed loop control of process air inlet dew point to module tempera-
ture differential expanded the range of system operation.
9. The CS-6 was designed and operated with process and cooling air at the
same conditions.
10. The CS-6 GSP was used to replace the DAU and ACE/IMS Data Management
System for manual operation.
11. The CS-6 successfully passed Shakedown, Design Verification, and
Acceptance Testing.
12. The CS-6 DVT results showed that the design CO removal efficiency and
electrical efficiency were exceeded by 6% and 5%, respectively.
13. The CS-6 testing demonstrated sub ystem operation at an elevated H2
and CO2 backpressure of 34.5 kN/m (5 psig).
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APPENDIX A
CS-6 DOCUMENTATION EXAMPLES
A-1
Li/c Systems, Jlc.
REVISION
-fci Ssttems,./ SPECIFICATION No. 882 LTR. B
DATECLEVELAND, OHIO 44122 LINE REPLACEABLE UNIT PAGE 1 OF 3 2/15/74
TITLE MOUNTING, H2 FLOW SENSOR AND DISTRIBUTION PART DRAWING NO. 438
FUNCTION:
The H, Flow Sensor and Distribution Mounting divides the incoming H2 flow equally
betweEn three electrochemical modules. It also senses the H2 flow rates to the
modules.
DESCRIPTION:
The H2 flow branches into three flow paths from a common inlet manifold. A pressure
drop producing orifice (Lee Jet No. 187-2-06000-0808) is installed in each of the
three flow paths to provide equal H2 flow rate into each of the modules. The H2
flow sensor consists of two electrically matched thermistors wired externally to
a bridge circuit and amplifier to produce a voltage signal proportional to H2 flow
rate.
DESIGN DATA:
Performance Characteristics
Operating pressure (nominal) 21 psia
Proof pressure 66 psia
Pressure drop 3.0 psid
Flow Rate 5.4 + .5 1pm
Reliability data
-6
Failure rate 2.8 x 10 failures/hr
MTBF 3.6 x 106 hr
Spares 2 (180-day mission profile)
Physical Characteristics See attached Drawing No. 438
Weight 4.8 lb
Volume 0.0112 ft
Basic configuration 3.31 x 3.62 x 1.86 in
Material Characteristics
A. Nonmetallic
Ethylene Propylene, Teflon, L-3217 Fluorel, Silastic RTV-732, Ecco-
bond 787AB Epoxy
B. Metallic
Stainless Steel, Aluminum
Electrical Characteristics
Normal thermistor resistance 20000+5% @ 25C
continued-
FIGURE A-i EXAMPLE OF A SPECIFICATION
A-2
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£fe Sytcms, w c. NUMBER 882 REVISION LETTER PAGE
CLEVELAND. OHIO 44122 B 2
INTERFACES:
Mechanical
H2 inlet 3/8 in CPV fitting
H2 outlets 1/4 in CPV fitting
Electrical
Connector Amphenol No. 348-40E10-12P1
Mounting Panel mounted with two captive
screws (Deutsch No. L7300-C-4-8)
ENVIRONMENT:
Cabin atmosphere
MAINTENANCE LEVEL AND METHOD:
Replacement of this Line Replaceable Unit is the first level of maintenance.
Time Required: 0.1 hour
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